Introduction
Increased drilling and higher energy prices caused the value of oil and gas production in the continental U.S. to increase by roughly $140 billion from 2009 to 2014. The growth generated billions in additional royalty income for owners of oil and gas rights spread throughout the country; some royalty owners live near producing regions, and others are absentee owners residing far from the extraction sites. Exploiting variation across U.S. counties and over time, we estimate the income multiplier effect from unanticipated changes in royalty income.
This multiplier represents the additional income attributable to the unexpected increase in valuable oil and gas production.
Our estimated multiplier contributes to the literature on the effects of policy-induced income shocks. Parker et al. (2013) study the economic stimulus payments of 2008 and find that consumer spent 50 to 90 percent of the payments. The authors note that the desirability of such payments depends critically on their multiplier effects. Similar studies ignore or assume-but do not estimate-a multiplier effect ((Johnson et al., 2006; Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003, 2009 ). Our context is novel in that we are able to estimate a multiplier from an economic shock rather than a policy shock, and we are able to do so using specific geographic and temporal variation. In comparison to the literature on government spending multipliers (Shoaa, 2013; Husman, 2016) , our empirical analysis estimates the multiplier effect of additional economic activity.
We also contribute to a growing literature on the economic effects of the shale oil and gas boom (citations), which has overwhelming focused on labor market effects, with almost no studies explicitly considering payments to resource owners (Marchand and Weber, 2017 ). Yet local versus absentee ownership of natural resources -and its associated income may profoundly shape the relationship between extraction and local income. If accruing to local residents, the royalty windfalls can plausibly stimulate local consumer demand or entrepreneurship. This approach stands in contrast to the seminal theoretical work linking a booming resource sector to the broader economy (Corden and Neary, 1982) , which focuses on workers moving across sectors and expenditure of additional income from higher wages.
That theory is silent on ownership and how the windfall created by the booming resource sector propagates through the economy.
Our empirical analysis relies on information from more than 2.2 million private oil and gas leases. The leases provide the address of the resource owner and allow us to estimate royalties paid to county residents from production within the county, as well as production from elsewhere in the continental United States. To isolate the effect of unanticipated royalty payments, we use an instrumental variable approach based on annual variation in royalty income caused by oil price shocks.
Using estimates of royalty income for the 2010-2013 period, we find that each dollar in unanticipated royalty income led to $1.52 increase in total income, which largely reflects greater wage income in the service sector. Overall, a U.S. county with complete local ownership of the subsurface captures 29 cents more of each dollar in production than a county with absentee ownership. Assuming the production of the median shale county in 2013, this translates into $1,098 per capita, or 5.3 percent of total income. We also find that for the average county experiencing a production increase over the study period, royalty income and its multiplier effect accounted for more than two-thirds of the total increase in per capita income between 2000 and 2013. The estimates help explain why the effects of resource extraction may vary substantially across regions based on historical patterns of ownership.
Literature 2.1 Responses to Income Shocks
A broad economics and finance literature has considered how consumers respond to income shocks, often focusing on how consumption changes with income. One strand of literature considers the propensity to consume out of tax refunds or rebates. (Johnson et al., 2006) used the Consumer Expenditure Survey to investigate consumers' response to 2001 U.S. tax rebates and found that consumers spent on average about two-thirds of their rebate.
Also looking at consumer responses to the 2001 rebate, (Agarwal et al., 2007) use panel data from credit card accounts and found that consumers who were more credit constrained spent about 40 percent of the average household rebate over a nine month period. For the more recent 2008 economic stimulus payments, (Parker et al., 2013) found that households spent 50 to 90 percent of their payments, with the highest proportion spent by older, low-income, and home-owning households.
In a category of its own, Hsieh (2003) looks at how Alaskan residents respond to payments from the oil-and-gas-funded Alaska Permanent Fund. He finds no evidence that households respond to this large and expected payment. The consumption of the same households, however, is very responsive to income tax refunds, which are smaller and less predictable than the Permanent Fund payments. A 10 percent increase in income increases non-durable consumption by 3 percent.
Another strand of literature looks at responses to lottery windfalls and inheritances. Imbens et al. (2001) find that winners saved about 16 percent of their prize and reduced their labor market participation-as evidenced by lower labor earnings. Likewise, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) find that receipt of an inheritance or gift increases the probability of selfemployment while Andersen and Nielsen (2012) find that unexpected inheritances increase business survival rates.
While none of these studies explicitly consider multiplier effects, they all point to possible channels by which income shocks could spill over to other parts of the local economy. Specifically, the above literature focuses on responses to income shocks, not their broader implications for the economy in which they occur. Rajan and Ramcharan (2015) , in contrast, traces the effects of an income and wealth shock (combined with credit availability) on local land prices around the time of the shock and decades afterwards. More closely related to our study, Gilje et al. (2016) studies the impact of increased deposits in branch banks in booming oil and gas regions, the subsequent increase in lending capacity, and export of liquidity to non-boom areas in the form of mortgage lending where banks had branches. Our study follows that work with a stronger structural link via royalty payments.
Fiscal Multipliers
The Great Recession has motivated a growing literature that uses state or local variation in government spending to estimate a multiplier effect on income or output. The studies generally find that each $1 in additional government spending creates between $1-2 in income or output. Acconcia et al. (2014) exploited unanticipated temporary contractions in local public spending in Italy and estimate spending/output multiplier of 1.5 to 1.9. Using shocks to U.S. state pensions, Shoaa (2013) found that each dollar of windfall-spending raised local income by 1.4. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) estimate the effects of government spending by exploiting variation in military buildups across the United States over 50 years and estimate an output multiplier of 1.5. Most recently, Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2015) use differences in spending from the Census Bureau during decennial censuses and found a county-level multiplier between 1.7 and 2. Similarly, Husman (2016) uses state and city variation in receipts of the 1936 veteran's bonus and infers an output multiplier of 1.7.
Resource Ownership and The Shale Boom
In places where the government owns most or all of the resource, the returns to ownership largely stay in the economy and their effects are implicitly captured in a general economic analysis because revenues from extraction accrue to the government and are available to fund investment, social spending, or tax cuts. This is true of the study by Mideksa (2013), which estimates how petroleum resources affected the national income of Norway, as well of that by James (2016) , which estimates the effect on the Alaskan economy of the discovery of oil deposits at Prudhoe Bay-a federally-owned resource.
In places with primarily private resource ownership, resource owners may live far from where the resources are located. The United States is unique in the world insofar as private individuals own most of the subsurface resources and typically profit from ownership by leasing their rights to energy firms (Fitzgerald and Rucker, 2016) . The lease specifies a share of the value of production-a royalty rate-to be paid to the resource owners, wherever she lives, in exchange for granting access to the resource. Once signed and production begins, leases generally remain in effect until production ends (Fitzgerald, 2014) .
Though research on resource booms has overwhelmingly focused on labor markets (Marchand and Weber, 2017), a growing literature suggests that effects related to resource ownership may be important. Brown et al. (2016) use leasing data from across the United States to show that royalty rates and the extent of local ownership vary substantially across the country. They also estimate royalty income from the major shale formations, reporting that six formations generated $39 billion in gross production royalties in 2014. Feyrer et al.
(2015) estimates the non-wage income effect in an analysis of the full income effect of shale development. Analyzing IRS Statistics of Income data, they find that each million dollars in production generated $66,000 in wage income and $61,000 in non-wage income within the county where production occurred. That wages accounted for only half of the local income effect from extraction is striking given the extensive focus of extraction on labor markets (Marchand and Weber, 2017) . The result also seems to hold in an individual state: looking at changes in rental and royalty income in Pennsylvania counties, Hardy and Kelsey (2015) find evidence that the royalty income effect exceeds other income effects.
Other research shows evidence of the economic implications of royalty payments. Using cross-sectional data on U.S. farms, Weber et al. (2013) (2015), which looked at farm real estate values in the same counties.
Economic Framework
Consider a local economy -a small open economy within a larger national economy -with an endowment of a natural resource in the spirit of Allcott and Keniston (2014) . Examples might be oil deposits or particularly fertile agricultural land. A shock such as an innovation (e.g., hydraulic fracturing) or change in policy (e.g., the Renewable Fuel Standard) causes a sharp increase in the demand for the resource and therefore the quantity of the resource supplied. Our focus here and in the empirical analysis is on the income of local residents of the economy, meaning individuals who resided in the small open economy prior to the shock.
Assume that residents earn income from selling labor and from renting out assets, which we will call royalties. The total income increase from greater resource demand -and therefore greater extraction -will stem from a direct wage effect and its multiplier effect, and a direct royalty effect and its multiplier effect. The direct wage effect is from extraction causing an increase in labor demand, which will increase the wage rate as long as firms do not face a perfectly elastic labor supply curve. The local spending of additional wage income will in turn have its own effect on labor demand, reinforcing the initial wage increase.
At the same time, greater resource demand will increase payments to resource owners and asset prices. Some owners may decide to sell their assets at the new higher price or to rent out the asset at a higher rental rate. In either case, resource owners experience a positive income shock. To the extent that owners live in the local economy, some of the greater resource income will likely be spent locally, thereby increasing labor demand in the same manner as increased spending of additional wage income.
The contribution of royalties to the total income effect for local residents depends heavily on the extent that resources are locally owned and on the use of greater royalty income by resource owners. Ownership of the resource by non-residents is conceptually equivalent to the local economy being a colony controlled by distant powers, with all rents leaving the local economy. If, instead, some or all of the resource is owned by residents, the greater resource income enters the household budget where it is saved or consumed. Resource owners could use their windfall to consume more leisure by working less or buying goods from outside the local economy. Both uses will have little, if any, effect on the rest of the local economy.
Spending on local goods and services would, in contrast, create additional income through increased labor demand and wages.
If owners instead save and invest some of their windfalls, the savings can generate additional capital income. If invested outside the local economy, as long as the investment generates a return, it will increase the flow of income to residents. Resource owners may also actively invest some windfalls locally, perhaps because of higher returns because of lower transaction and monitoring costs. Building and renting out a commercial property, for example, would have lower transaction and monitoring costs if made near the investor's residence.
Alternatively, some resource owners may have faced credit constraints prior to receiving the windfall, in which case the windfall allows them to start or expand a business. To the extent that some of this local investment would not have happened in absence of windfalls to local resource owners, it will increase local labor demand relative to the case where no windfalls accrue locally.
Empirical Approach

The Local Income Effect of Shale Development
We first estimate the total per capita income effect for the average shale county. Estimating (1) reveals how the difference in average income between shale and non-shale counties evolved year by year as shown by:
where γ i is a county fixed effect and θ st is a state-year fixed effect.
The binary shale variable Shale equals one if the combined quantity of oil and gas production in the county increased from 2000 to 2013 according to data reported by DrillingInfo (described in the next section). We label these counties as shale counties because the vast majority of them (87 percent) are in or adjacent to shale formations according to the Energy Information Administration's 2011 delineation of shale boundaries ( Figure 1 ).
The technological breakthroughs that made drilling in shale profitable only emerged after 2000 and propagated unevenly. Because growth in production in the 2000s occurred primarily in shale and other low-permeability formations, the binary shale variable is credibly exogenous to county-specific shocks (other than those related to shale development) and
should result in economically similar prior trends for shale and non-shale counties. To assess prior trends, which are necessary for identification of the average income effect from shale development, we estimate (1) for the 1990-2013 period. The magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction between the shale variable and the dummy variables for 1990-1999 will reveal any differences in trends prior to widespread drilling in shale.
We also decompose the total income effect into changes in wage and non-wage income.
Even though non-wage income includes royalty income, the decomposition cannot reveal the role of royalties in the total income effect. Non-wage income includes income other than royalties, but perhaps more importantly, some of the increases in wage income may stem from the spending of royalty income. Estimating the role of royalties requires an estimate of the growth in royalty income in particular as well as its multiplier effect on local income.
Estimating the Effects of Royalty Income
To estimate how royalty income affects income in the broader economy, we use a firstdifferenced model where the change in income is regressed on the change in gross royalty income:
where θ st is a state-year fixed effect and ∆Royalties it is the change in gross royalty income received by county residents from production anywhere in the continental United States.
Because of variation in the size of county economies, we normalize income and gross royalties by the previous year's population. The coefficient λ indicates the change in the income measure Y it for each dollar increase in gross royalty income.
Some of the change in gross royalty income is likely anticipated by owners, especially those driven by predictable changes in production from an aging well. To isolate the effect of unanticipated changes in royalties, we use an instrumental variable approach that exploits variation in royalty income driven by oil price changes alone. 1 Let initial royalty income be defined as the product of the acre-weighted mean royalty rate on acreage owned by residents of county i anywhere in the continental U.S., the gross production from that acreage, and the mean output price in year t:
1 We use the change in oil prices to predict the change in all royalty payments even though some payments come from natural gas production. It turns out that this does not result in a weak instrument (see Table 2 ). This in part reflects the increasing importance of natural gas liquids in the value of unconventional natural gas. The prices of these liquids are more correlated with oil than with gas (0.52 vs. 0.1).
A reasonable prediction for the change in royalty income from year t − 1 to t is:
which can be re-written as
Equation (5) motivates a first-stage regression of the form
In addition to isolating unanticipated changes in royalties, the instrumental variable approach addresses attenuation bias caused by measurement error in royalty income. Our calculation of royalty income, which the following section explains, provides a credible but imperfect estimate. For example, we can calculate the acre-weighted royalty rate on acreage owned by county residents but do not have data to calculate a production-weighted royalty rate. The royalty rate applied to the average dollar of production may be higher or lower than the royalty rate for the average acre.
A threat to the validity of the instrument-the predicted change in royalties-is a correlation between it and local drilling, which will have its own effect on local income through employment, thereby creating a correlation between the instrument and the error term in (2).
The correlation between the predicted change in royalties and local drilling is because the predicted change depends in part on the lagged quantity of production occurring on acreage owned by county residents, some of which likely occurs in the recipient's home county. Lagged local production may in turn be correlated with subsequent drilling, particularly in periods of high energy prices. The geographic coincidence of conventional and unconventional formations increases these concerns.
To address this potential threat to the instrument's validity, we control for measures of the change in mining earnings and the number of wells drilled, both normalized by lagged population. For both drilling measures, we control for the contemporaneous change, the change in the prior year, and the average contemporaneous change in counties contiguous to county i (using a queen contiguity matrix). Combined, the six control variables should provide a robust accounting of any relationship between local incomes and the drilling industry.
Data
Lease Data
We obtained information about individual mineral leases across the United States from private data provider DrillingInfo. We processed the data to focus on private mineral own- date signed, and the royalty rate. Importantly, the leases also include information on the address of the mineral owner.
We exclude duplicate leases, those appearing to be less than arm's length, and those between known oil and gas operators. In cases where fractionated mineral interests resulted in multiple leases for a single parcel, we weighted each fractionated interest according to equal ownership shares. More detail on the data construction is included in the data appendix.
Oil and Gas Production, Drilling and Prices
Information from DrillingInfo was used to build a county-level panel dataset of oil and gas production and drilling for the years 2000 to 2013. Economically important production occurs on Federal and state estates, with royalties paid to respective government coffers. To focus on private royalties, we net out federal production as reported by the Office of Natural
Resource Revenue, and aggregated to the county-year level by the U.S. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We also net out state production, which we collected directly from responsible state agencies-the data appendix details the procedures that we used.
We value oil production using the state-level first purchase price of oil available from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). For natural gas, we used a state-level wellhead price series, also from the EIA. We extend the EIA series, which stopped in 2010, by regressing state-level wellhead prices on the U.S. average wellhead price and state fixed effects using data from 1970 to 2010. The coefficients from the model, which accounted for 93 percent of the variation in prices over the period, were applied to the U.S. average wellhead price to construct state-level wellhead prices after 2010. The approach assumes that the relationship between state-level wellhead prices and the national average wellhead price remained constant after 2010.
Estimating Royalty Income to County Residents
Treating each county as a distinct leasing market, we calculate acre-weighted mean royalty rates for every pair of producing and receiving counties that we observe. This allows for the possibility of different royalty rates for local and absentee owners. The county-specific mean royalty rate governing payments from acreage in producing county c to residents in the receiving county r is calculated according to,
These county-specific mean royalty rates can be aggregated on an acre-weighed basis to calculate a county-wide mean royalty rate, along the lines used in Brown et al. (2016) .
Another related statistic, which we use in the discussion of the empirical results, is the percent of observed acreage of each producing county that is owned by local residents. This share varies between 0 to 100 percent.
The value of production in county c payable to county r in year t is calculated as:
for each observed combination of c and r.
Having calculated the royalties from every county to every other county according to equation (8), the flow of royalties to residents of a particular county r in year t is given by:
where counties c ∈ C are all producing counties and r = c corresponds to locally-retained royalties. This calculation is made for each year t. The estimate is an upper bound on the royalties paid to royalty owners because well operators often deduct transportation allowances and other post-production costs from gross royalties.
Our dataset of leases is extensive but not exhaustive. We have data on private leasing markets in 575 counties. Combined, these counties accounted for 82 percent of onshore oil and gas production in 2013 according to the DrillingInfo production data. For counties with no private leasing data, we assign a state-average royalty rate and assume that all royalties are paid locally.
One county in Texas' Eagle Ford Shale, Karnes County, had an increase of royalty income per capita several times larger than any other county (more than $60,000 in one year). We exclude Karnes County in the regression analysis of royalty income multipliers.
Income and Wage Data
We use the county-level Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income data (IRS-SOI),
which are based on individual tax returns and assigned to counties based on the addresses in the returns. 3 We use adjusted gross income (AGI) as our measure of total income, which is then broken into income from wages and salaries and non-wage income, defined as AGI Table ? ? provides descriptive statistics for sample counties for the years 2010-2013, with all variables except the shale and metro indicator normalized by lagged population or, in the case of wells drilled, by lagged population divided by 1,000. All monetary variables are converted to 2010 dollars. We focus on the years 2010 to 2013 for estimation of gross royalty income multipliers because the majority of leasing occurred prior to 2010; for 90 percent of counties, the average year of signing was before 2010. The focus on later years limits the extent that we use a lease signed in 2011, for example, to inform the flow of royalties in 2010.
Over the period the average county saw an annual increase in gross royalty income of $62
per person, which is almost double the average increase in mining earnings. This average increase in gross royalty income represented about 9 percent of the average increase in total income as measured by reported Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). Looking at particular percentiles reveals that royalty income is quite skewed: the median county only saw a $2 per capita increase, while the counties at the 90th and 95th percentiles saw increases of $74 and $204 per person, respectively.
Growth in drilling was even more concentrated than growth in royalty income. The county at the 90th percentile for drilling growth had an increase less than one tenth of a well per 1,000 persons while the county at the 95th percentile had an increase of 0.4 wells well per thousand persons.
Both the IRS-SOI and QCEW wage income measures show increases in wages over the study period, but the IRS-SOI measure is about 60 percent larger than the QCEW measure.
This likely reflects the more comprehensive nature of the IRS measure. For example, QCEW does not cover the self-employed, military, railroad, and certain farm, domestic, and nonprofit workers. Another difference between the two series is that the QCEW wage data have a standard deviation one-third larger than that of the IRS-SOI data. The greater annual variability is likely because people change their county of employment more often than their county of residence. The shale county definition only requires that a county have an increase in oil and gas production over the 2000 to 2013 period. To see how the results change with different thresholds of production growth, we re-estimate the coefficients in (1) after dropping counties whose change in production was positive but less than $25 million and then again after dropping those whose increase was less than $250 million. As expected, the income effects increase. For the two subsamples, the total income effect in 2013 increased to $3,650 and then to $6,705 (Table A1 ). As before, non-wage income accounts for about two-thirds of the total income increase.
As mentioned earlier, breaking total income into wage and non-wage income does not indicate the share of the total income effect accounted for by royalties. Non-wage income includes royalty income but also income from rental properties, proprietorships, and partnerships. Moreover, local expenditure of royalty income may in fact account for some of the increase in wage income. This link is the focus of the next section.
The Multiplier Effect of Royalty Income
We establish the relevance of our instrumental variable -the predicted change in royalty income from oil price changes alone -by estimating (6) as metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties, we also provide first-stage results for these subsamples. Table 2 shows that when only controlling for state-year fixed effects, a $1 increase in predicted royalty income led to $0.97 greater royalty income; when adding control variables, the coefficient is $0.88. The coefficient is roughly similar when splitting counties out by shale status or metro status. The F-statistic of the excluded instrument (predicted royalties) is 89 with additional control variables, indicating sufficient instrument strength to avoid concerns about weak-instrument bias. For the subsamples, the F-statistic is always above 40. Table 3 shows the results of estimating (2) with and without controls for drilling and mining earnings and for total adjusted gross income and its wage and non-wage components.
In all cases, controlling for various drilling and mining earnings variables reduces the multiplier estimate. For example, $1 in gross royalty income is associated with $1.78 in total adjusted gross income when only including state-year fixed effects and $1.52 when including control variables. Because of their greater credibility, we focus on the estimates that hold drilling and mining earnings constant.
Properly interpreting the estimated multipliers requires assumptions about differences between gross and net royalty income. Because well operators deduct various costs from payments to royalty owners, royalty owners would receive and report on their taxes less than a $1 in net royalty income for each $1 in gross royalties. Ignoring such deductions results in a conservative estimate of the multiplier effect of royalty income. For example, if each $1 in gross royalties leads to $0.90 in net royalty income, then the coefficient of $1.52 indicates that $0.62 in non-royalty income was created in the local economy (= 0.52+0.10). To discuss the results, we take this conservative approach and assume that $1 in gross royalties leads to $1 in net royalties.
The estimated income effect of $1.52 indicates that each $1 in gross royalty income received by county residents generates $0.52 elsewhere in the local economy such that it enters the income of people filing taxes in that county. The multiplier is consistent with other local income multipliers in the literature; for example, Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2015) find each dollar of government spending generates and additional $0.7 to $1 of local income.
Breaking total AGI into its wage and non-wage components shows that each $1 in gross royalties leads to $0.39 in additional wage income and $0.13 in non-wage, non-royalty income.
The estimates indicate that a large part of the multiplier effect of royalty income comes through greater labor market earnings. This is intuitive: as royalty income is spent in local restaurants and other businesses it increases labor demand and earnings for others who work and reside in the county. The $0.13 in additional non-wage income, which is only marginally statistically significant, would stem from the spending of royalty income in the local economy in ways that increase business or partnership income. Additionally, if royalties are saved and invested they would also generate additional non-wage income for county residents.
By comparison, the OLS multiplier estimates, which are shown in Table A4 , are dramatically smaller than the IV estimates. The difference is expected. Royalty owners should have little response to anticipated changes in royalty income. In addition, substantial measurement error in royalty income would attenuate the coefficient towards zero.
Tables 4a-4c show the total, wage, and non-wage multipliers for counties split by shale and metro status. The estimated total income multipliers vary from 1.07 to 1.94, with the variation driven by the non-wage multiplier, which ranges from 0.60 to 1.65. It is less precisely estimated than the wage multiplier, which is expected because non-wage income includes gains and losses from business or capital investments, which will vary substantially more than annual wage income.
The wage multipliers, in contrast, are similar across subsamples, only ranging from $0.28 (shale counties) to $0.54 (metro counties) (Table 4b ). The larger wage multiplier in metro counties is plausible because royalty recipients likely spend more of their windfalls in areas offering more local goods and services.
As noted in the description of the sample, the distribution of royalty income is very skewed. To test the robustness of our multiplier estimate, we re-estimate the total income multiplier but dropping the top 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 percent of counties for the change in royalty income from 2010 to 2013. The estimates are quite stable. The multiplier based on the full sample is 1.52; after cutting the top 2.0 percent of counties, the multiplier is 1.69 (Table A5 ).
Royalty-Wage Multiplier Effects By Industry
The IRS-SOI data do not allow identification of the industries where the wage income effect is accruing. We therefore look at the effect of royalty income on labor earnings as reported in the QCEW. Looking at wage effects by sector is one way to check the plausibility of our results: if the wage-multiplier estimates reflect a true causal effect of local spending of royalty income, then most of the effect should appear in the service sector. The service sector is more local than, say, manufacturing, which is tradable and typically sells to broader markets. We examine three sectors: services, construction, and manufacturing. We exclude mining because we control for the change in mining earnings in the regression. Table 5 shows estimates for the full sample and then by the shale and metro county subsamples. Overall, the QCEW data give point estimates of the royalty-wage multiplier smaller than that of the IRS-SOI. The QCEW data also yield less precise estimates, such that the wage multiplier is never statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics showing greater variability in the QCEW measure of wages than in the IRS-SOI measure, a likely artifact of greater year-to-year variation in where people work than where they reside.
Despite the imprecisions of the QCEW estimates, the estimated multipliers across sectors suggest that essentially all of the increase in wage income occurs in the service sector (see Table 5b ). Wages in the construction and manufacturing sectors show essentially no change.
Moreover, these near-zero effects are also relatively precisely estimated, with standard errors of 0.04 for construction and 0.02 for manufacturing.
The lack of a construction effect suggests that the drilling and mining control variables are accounting for any link between royalties, drilling, and earnings. The construction sector is one sector where studies of drilling activity have found large multiplier effects. Fetzer (2014) finds that drilling-driven expansions in mining earnings caused the largest earnings increases in the construction sector, with each $1 in mining earnings causing a $0.38 increase in construction earnings.
Similarly, the lack of a manufacturing effect suggests that our empirical approach is not undermined by confounding factors related to broad economic trends. Because most manufacturing firms serve broader regional markets, greater incomes to local residents should have little effect on sales and earnings of local manufacturing firms. This is consistent with our findings: for the full sample and the four subsamples, the estimated multiplier is never larger than 0.04, with a standard error that is also never larger than 0.04.
Resource Ownership and Local Incomes
The average shale income effect increased by $1,081 from 2010 to 2013, of which $735 came from increases in non-wage income (Figure 2a , Tables A1-A3 ). Over the same period, royalty income increased by $1,031 more in shale counties if considering the full sample and $507 if excluding the top five royalty income counties, suggesting that most, if not all, of the non-wage income increase was from royalty income. Using a royalty income increase of $507 from 2010 to 2013, the royalty income multiplier of $1.52 predicts a total income increase of $770, or 71 percent of the total income effect. This is a conservative estimate because of the exclusion of royalty outliers.
We further consider the role of local resource ownership by explicitly considering variation in the percent of minerals owned by county residents. The percentage varies enormously, ranging from 0 to 100 percent, with the median county having 24 percent of the acreage locally owned ( The significance of local resource ownership is striking considering the money at stake for the average county. In 2013, total royalty income for the average county-using our estimated income multiplier of 1.52-was nearly $22 million (Figure 3) . The cumulative total for the roughly 3,000 counties in our sample was $64 billion, roughly 0.4 percent of U.S gross domestic product in 2013. If at least some royalty income is spent outside of the county of the recipient, then our multiplier serves as a lower-bound estimate due to potential leakages.
Resource ownership may play a large economic role for resources other than oil and gas.
With reasonably competitive land markets, for example, shocks to agricultural prices should generate large windfalls for land owners, who may or may not live near the land they own.
This fits the findings of Weber et al. (2014) who find that each price-driven $1 increase in agricultural revenues generated $0.64 in local income, of which 36 percent went to nonfarmers owning farm assets such as land.
Conclusion
This study documents the role of resource ownership in shaping the local income effects of Note: All variables except the shale and metro indicator variables are normalized by the lag of county population. Wells drilled is per 1000 persons. The production-weighted average royalty rate for counties for which we have leasing data is 0.19. Only counties for which leasing data are available are used in calculating the percentiles for the Local Ownership Share. The multiplier used to calculate the total income effect is that estimated using the full sample, which is 1.52.
Appendix: Additional Empirical Results
Average Shale Income Effects Over Time Note: The number of shale counties in the Full Sample, Subsample 1 and Subsample 2 are 328, 181, and 90. Shale counties are defined as having an increase in the combined quantity of oil and gas production from 2000 to 2013. Subsample 1 excludes Shale counties where the increase in oil and gas production was less than $25 million (with production valued at a constant price of $50 per barrel of oil equivalent). Subsample 2 excludes Shale counties where the increase was less than $250 million. Note: The number of shale counties in the Full Sample, Subsample 1 and Subsample 2 are 328, 181, and 90. Shale counties are defined as having an increase in the combined quantity of oil and gas production from 2000 to 2013. Subsample 1 excludes Shale counties where the increase in oil and gas production was less than $25 million (with production valued at a constant price of $50 per barrel of oil equivalent). Subsample 2 excludes Shale counties where the increase was less than $250 million. Note: The number of shale counties in the Full Sample, Subsample 1 and Subsample 2 are 328, 181, and 90. Shale counties are defined as having an increase in the combined quantity of oil and gas production from 2000 to 2013. Subsample 1 excludes Shale counties where the increase in oil and gas production was less than $25 million (with production valued at a constant price of $50 per barrel of oil equivalent). Subsample 2 excludes Shale counties where the increase was less than $250 million. Importantly, the observations also include information on the address of the mineral owner, which allows computation of our local ownership measures.
OLS Estimates of Royalty Income Multiplier
Robustness to Excluding High Royalty Growth Counties
Mineral leases are effectively option contracts; in some cases the option expires before production can begin. Cases in which we identified repeated leases of the same parcel led us to drop previous leases and focus on the most recent effective lease. We also excluded secondary transactions recorded as leases rather than assignments. These transactions were identified by text matching.
Another concern about leasing data is that multiple instruments may be required to lease acreage with fractionated mineral ownership. Because we acre-weighted our observed leases, we used legal descriptions to select only one instrument if several different owners signed leases to the same mineral property that were effective simultaneously.
After cleaning to data to include only active primary leases without duplication, we defined the county as a pertinent leasing market. Weighting the different leases we observed by their acreage, we calculated county-level average royalty rates to capture cross-sectional variation in the prevailing royalty rate. We observe the ZIP code of both the grantor (mineral owner) and the grantee, so for each county where we observe leases, we were able to create acre-weighted measures of where royalty flows are due from production in each county. Because ZIP codes are subsets of counties and states, we constructed measures of county-level NPRI (net private royalty interest) for each potential recipient county. Counties can then be aggregated to the state level.
Publicly-Owned Minerals
In many states oil and gas production occurs on minerals owned by either the federal or the state government, or both. The share of overall production obtained from these publicly-owned minerals varies substantially from state to state. In order to properly account for production and royalties from privately-owned minerals, we must first account for the publicly-owned share. To that end, we obtain information on oil and gas production and royalty revenues from both federal and state-owned minerals for sampled states.
Federal production is tracked by the Office of Natural Resource Revenue (ONRR), and aggregated to the county-year level by the U.S. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 9
For state-owned minerals, we collected information from each individual state that owns acreage that is leased for oil and gas development. Each state keeps records of production volumes and lease royalty revenues. We solicited royalty information for state-owned mineral production in thirteen states; four of our sample states do not have state-owned mineral leasing programs: Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. These states are not members of the Western State Lands Commissioners Association, which is a clearinghouse for information about management of state land assets. We were able to obtain some information on state-owned mineral production for California, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. The data that we were able to collect were a mix of physical production and revenue aggregates. The following sections detail the data procedures we used for each state.
California
Approximately 95% of oil and gas production in the State of California falls under the jurisdiction of the California State Lands Commission (CSLC). A portion of production and royalty revenues arise from State School Lands. These numbers are reported by the CSLC in annual state reports. Revenues obtained from the State School Lands are directed to the California State Teachers Retirement Fund. 10 Revenues from the remaining mineral resources under the jurisdiction of the CSLC contribute to the state's General Fund; production and royalty revenue numbers for these resources, separated between offshore and onshore production, are provided by the CSLC Senior Mineral Resources Engineer. The onshore portion of General Fund minerals is combined with School Lands resources to obtain an aggregate measure of production from state-owned minerals in California.
Colorado
Colorado data is obtained from the State Land Board Department of Natural Resources for years 2011 and 2012. 11 The department's Mineral Auditor provides the state royalty share of production. The royalty share is then multiplied by the average royalty rate to back out the total production of oil and gas from state minerals.
Louisiana
The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources makes State oil and gas production data available on their website. 12 Annual state share of production is obtained for every year back to 1967 for both oil and gas. Multiplication of the state share of production by the average royalty rate yields an estimate of total production from state minerals. Mineral royalty totals are also made available by the state DNR as far back as 1960 and require no manipulation. 13
Michigan
Production volumes and royalty revenues for Michigan's state-owned oil and gas production could not be obtained and must be estimated. The Revenue Verification Unit Supervisor for the State Department of Natural Resources supplied the state royalty share of production. We divide the state royalty share of production by the average royalty rate of one-sixth to obtain estimates of production volumes from state-owned minerals. Royalty revenue estimates are obtained by multiplying the state shares of oil and gas production by their respective annual average prices.
Montana
The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation Trust Land Management Division for the State of Montana makes available Fiscal Year Annual Reports prepared by the Minerals Management Bureau. The Annual Reports note production and revenue information for all leases managed by the Bureau. This includes information on oil and natural gas production and royalty revenues obtained from State lands. 14 We utilize oil and gas production volumes in addition to royalty revenues from State-owned minerals in Montana.
New Mexico
Production and royalty revenues from state-owned minerals in New Mexico are overseen by the State Lands Office. The department publishes annual reports that include data on oil and gas production and royalty revenue for the year. The three most recent years' reports are made available on the department's website. 15 We obtain production data for the remaining years of interest from the Oil and Gas Unit Manager and royalty revenue information from the Royalty Management Division's CPA.
North Dakota
The North Dakota Department of Trust Lands oversees oil and gas production on stateowned minerals. 16 Production volume data for 2007-2012 is provided by the department's Land and Minerals Professional. The department's Revenue Compliance Director supplies royalty revenue information for years 2010-2012.
Texas
Oil and gas production from state-owned minerals in Texas is managed by two entities: the Permanent University Fund (PUF) lands and the General Land Office (GLO). PUF lands production data is provided by the University of Texas System University Lands' Associate Landman. 17 We obtain GLO production data from the Energy Resources Mineral Leasing Contact at the General Lands Office. 18 We aggregate PUF and GLO data and construct aggregate measures of oil and gas production and royalty revenues from state-owned minerals. Condensate, oil, and gas production volumes are obtained for years 1990-2012 while royalty revenues from oil and gas are limited to 2000-2012.
Utah
The State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administrations tracks oil and gas royalty revenues from state-owned minerals and does not track production volumes. The Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining provided county-year production volumes by mineral ownership type.
Wyoming
The Office of State Lands and Investments manages leases and royalties for production from minerals owned by the state of Wyoming. The Royalty Compliance Supervisor provided annual totals for royalty revenues from oil, natural gas, and condensate. 19 The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission collects oil and gas production numbers and reports production volumes on their website. 20 We obtain oil and gas production volumes by year for the window 2000-2014.
Calculation Private Production
In order to establish royalty flows, aggregate annual production of oil and gas from private minerals was imputed. Aggregate production is the sum of private, state, and federal production. We imputed the production levels on an annual basis, at both state and county levels of aggregation. Because state mineral production was typically reported to us at the state level, we allocated that production across counties. Where we received data disaggregated to the county-year level, we used it.
Private Revenue
To establish gross revenue at the wellhead, we multiplied private mineral production figures for oil and natural gas by annual state-specific wellhead (for natural gas) or first purchase prices (for oil), in states where those series were available from EIA. For states that do not have their own series, we used the U.S. natural gas wellhead prices, and the U.S. First Purchase Price (excluding Alaska North Slope). For states that had their own series, but the series were discontinued for later years, we estimated the average basis differentials between the state wellhead value and benchmark prices (WTI Cushing for oil and Henry Hub for natural gas), and assumed that those basis differentials did not change during later years. This gives an aggregate gross revenue for each state and county in each year.
Royalty Flows
To establish flows of gross royalties between states or counties, the observed-acre-weighted royalty rate was calculated for each producing-receiving pair. Then the receiving location was assigned a weighted share of production from each originating location. These weights necessarily summed to one to provide for the allocation of all production revenues. Once the weights were established, gross revenue from each producing region was allocated into revenue flows. The revenue flows to various counties can then be used to create ratios of received royalties to production at different spatial scales.
